It is increasingly clear that existing phone security mechanisms are inadequate and that change is necessary. Instead of protecting phone conversations from eavesdropping, the UK government's proposed voice encryption standard appears to be designed to facilitate undetectable mass surveillance.
T he current state of phone security leaves a lot to be desired. Landline calls are almost entirely unencrypted, and cellphone calls are unencrypted aside from the radio link between the handset and phone network. Although the latest cryptography standards for 3G and 4G cellphones are reasonably strong, attackers can force a phone to fall back to older standards that have easy-to-break or no cryptography. In addition, the vast majority of phones will not alert users that such an attack is underway.
When cellphone cryptography was designed, only well-funded government intelligence agencies could afford the equipment necessary to intercept the radio link. However, similar devices based on open source software can now be made for about $1,500. 1 As a result, governments, companies, and individuals are increasingly looking for better security. A second driver for better phone call encryption is the convergence of the Internet and phone networks. The 4G LTE cellphone standard-under development by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP)-carries voice over IP (VoIP), and desktop phones (such as those used by companies) are increasingly doing the same. When voice calls travel over the more open Internet, further security mechanisms are needed.
Like Internet data encryption, voice encryption can be broa dly categorized as link encryption, where each intermediary can encrypt data before passing it to the next, or endto-end encryption, where communications are encrypted so that only the legitimate endpoints can access the unencrypted communication. End-to-end encryption is preferable for security because it prevents intermediaries from being able to eavesdrop on communications, and ensures that communications will be encrypted throughout the delivery process.
Current cellphone encryption standards are based on link encryption, in which the phone encrypts calls between it and the phone network using cryptographic keys stored on the subscriber identity module (SIM). Encryption can be present within the network, but the network provider still has access to unencrypted data. This means that, aside from the vulnerability to fall-back
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attacks on the radio link, network providers and their suppliers are tempting targets for attackers. Examples of these types of incidents include the 2004 attack on Vodafone in Greece, 2 the 2010 attack on SIM card supplier Gemalto in France, and the 2012 attack on Belgacom in Belgium. The identity of the Vodafone hacker remains unknown (though the US National Security Agency [NSA] is suspected), but the Snowden leaks revealed that the attacks against Belgacom and Gemalto were carried out by the UK's signal intelligence agency, Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). 3, 4 Email is typically only secured by link encryption, if at all, with HTTPS encrypting access to most webmail and Transport Layer Security (TLS) sometimes encrypting other communication protocols that carry email, such as the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP), and Post Office Protocol version 3 (POP3). The fact that intermediaries have access to plaintext creates a vulnerability, as demonstrated by the 2009 Gmail hack, which likely originated in China. End-to-end email encryption is possible using the OpenPGP or secure MIME (S/MIME) protocols, but these protocols are not common because of their poor usability, which is at least partially a result of having to remain compatible with older, insecure email standards.
Because there is no expectation of compatibility among different networks with instant messaging, more progress has been made with instant messaging applications in terms of end-to-end security. However, secure voice communication has received less attention than instant messaging, so here I examine what should be expected of a secure voice communication system, par ticularly the UK government-backed MIKEY-SAKKE protocol (Sakai-Kasahara Key Encryption in Multimedia Internet KEYing).
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MIKEY-SAKKE AND SECURE CHORUS
MIKEY-SAKKE is the security protocol behind the Secure Chorus 6 voice (and video) encryption standard. It was commissioned and designed by GCHQ through its information security arm, CESG. In 2015, GCHQ announced that it will only certify voice encryption products through its Commercial Product Assurance (CPA) security evaluation scheme if the product implements MIKEY-SAKKE and Secure Chorus. As a result, MIKEY-SAKKE has monopolized classified UK government voice communications, so companies developing secure voice communication sys tems must implement it in order to gain access to this market. GCHQ can also set requirements in the public sector and for companies operating critical national infrastructure. UK government standards are influential in guiding nongovernment purchase decisions, and MIKEY-SAKKE is already being marketed commercially as "government-grade security," capitalizing on its approval for use in the UK government. For this reason (and because GCHQ has provided a free open source library to make it easier and cheaper to deploy Secure Chorus), we can expect MIKEY-SAKKE to be used widely in industry and possibly by the public. Thus, it is important to consider whether MIKEY-SAKKE is appropriate for wide-scale use.
SECURITY CRITERIA
The Electronic Frontier Foundation's (EFF's) Secure Messaging Scorecard (www.eff.org/secure-messaging -scorecard) examines a range of messaging technologies-such as chat clients, text messaging apps, and video calling technologies-and rates them against seven security best practices. The following seven criteria serve as a useful starting point to develop security requirements for voice encryption. The final three criteria involve whether the implementation (5) and design (6) can be reviewed, and whether they actually have been reviewed (7) .
There is an ongoing debate about whether these seven criteria are ideal for evaluating a product's security, but they are based on years of experience of using instant messaging tools in hostile environments and are representative of some of the ways in which communication security is breached in practice. In particular, a common thread throughout the criteria is a recognition that security breaches often occur as a result of flaws in the security protocol design and software implementation, rather than in the underlying cryptographic algorithms.
Robust systems try to minimize the number of components that are in a position to break a user's security, such as the operator of the communication links (criteria 1 and 3) or the network provider (criterion 2). Robust systems should try to build confidence in security design and implementation of the remaining components (criteria 5, 6, and 7). Finally, when compromises do happen, the damage should be limited (criterion 4).
Assessing the security of MIKEY-SAKKE
To evaluate MIKEY-SAKKE against these and other criteria, we need to explore how the security protocol works in more detail. MIKEY-SAKKE extends the MIKEY standard, which was designed for voice and video encryption, by using SAKKE. MIKEY focuses on the most difficult part of secure communications-establishing a cryptographic key, typically using historically slow asymmetric cryptography-and leaves the actual job of encrypting communications (with fast symmetric cryptography under the session key that was established) for implementers to select. The Secure Chorus standards, however, recommend the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in Galois Counter Mode (GCM) with a 128-bit key size, a widely used standard that is considered sufficiently secure for almost any purpose.
All MIKEY variants-and keyexchange algorithms in general-aim to ensure that legitimate communication partners share a session key that no one else can infer. MIKEY supports the ephemeral Diffie-Hellman (EDH) algorithm, which is widely used when both communication partners are online at the same time. In EDH, the two communication partners each generate a random number and send it in encrypted form to each other. Then, using their own random number and the encrypted form of their partner's random number, each partner will be able to compute exactly the same session key. Someone eavesdropping on the exchange will not be able to guess the key, even if they later compromise the computers of either or both of the communication partners.
EDH allows systems to be secure against eavesdropping (meeting criteria 1 and 2) and offers forward security (criterion 4), but is not in itself resistant to man-in-the-middle attacks (criterion 3) because the attacker could perform a separate EDH exchange with each partner to learn both keys. Therefore, EDH exchanges are usually digitally signed with a long-term asymmetric key to prevent man-inthe-middle attacks while still offering forward security. However, it is necessary to be able to securely verify this digital signature to fully meet criterion 3.
Variants of EDH with digital signatures underlie almost all end-to-end encrypted instant-messaging systems, (Mas by definition both communication partners are online during the conversation and can agree on keys. The same situation applies to voice and video calls. However, for email and email-like systems where the recipient is not necessarily online, EDH cannot be straightforwardly used. For Open-PGP and S/MIME, the sender generates a session key and encrypts it to the recipient's public key, and then sends this with the message encrypted under the session key. In this way, end-to-end encryption is achieved. To be secure, the sender must be sure to use the right public key for the recipient (and not that of a man in the middle). Because discovering the recipient's private key will allow all past messages to be decrypted, this does not offer for ward security.
Although MIKEY supports EDH, MIKEY-SAKKE works very similarly to email encryption. The call initiator generates key material, uses SAKKE to encrypt it to the other communication partner (responder), and sends this message to the responder during the call setup. However, SAKKE does not require that the initiator discover the responder's public key because it uses identity-based encryption (IBE). In conventional public-key systems, each party generates its own public and private key and distributes the public key to anyone who needs it; in an IBE system, all private keys are generated by the network provider from its master private key. To prevent tampering, the MIKEY-SAKKE message is also digitally signed using the Elliptic CurveBased Certificateless Signatures for Identity-based Encryption (ECCSI) algorithm.
Using the responder's unique identity (such as email address or phone number) and the network provider's master public key, the initiator can compute the responder's public key and encrypt the key material. To recover the session key, as shown in Figure 2 , the responder needs to generate the public key for the initiator (from the network provider's master public key) and to have asked the network provider for the private key corresponding to his or her own identity before the call occurred. The responder can then verify the digital signature (using the initiator's public key), decrypt the key material (using the responder's private key), and derive a session key from the decrypted key material and other message fields. Although the network provider's master key is valid for a long period of time, users' keys are only valid for a month, so the network provider must keep the master key per manently available to allow users to periodically download the current private key that corresponds to their identity.
MIKEY-SAKKE has an advantage over EDH-based key-exchange algorithms in that only one key-exchange message is needed, so call setup time is reduced. It also changes the complexity of key distribution: in standard public-key systems, the challenge is securely distributing public keys; in IBE, the challenge is securely distributing private keys. However, MIKEY-SAKKE introduces fatal flaws to protocol security. Criterion 1 is met (calls are encrypted from initiator to responder) but criterion 2 is not (someone who learns the network provider's master private key can discover the session key and thus eavesdrop on calls). Criterion 3 fails because if the network provider is compromised, an impersonator could also generate all users' private keys. Criterion 4 is not met because past communications can be decrypted if the responder's private key-or network provider's master private key-is discovered.
The existence of a master private key that can decrypt all calls-past and present-without detection, on a permanently available computer, creates a huge security risk and is an irresistible target for attackers. In addition, calls that cross different network providers (for example, be tween different companies) would be decrypted at a gateway computer, creating another location where calls could be intercepted.
Criteria 5, 6, and 7 cannot be assessed because they apply to the product rather than the algorithms the product uses, though MIKEY-SAKKE helps here. The protocol is well documented as an Internet standard, is reasonably simple, and has been externally evaluated. 7 Other security protocols Identities:
• So, why was MIKEY-SAKKE designed this way? Why is GCHQ not permitting the use of EDH-based voice encryption standards for UK government communications and not supporting the deployment of such protocols elsewhere, despite their superior security? It certainly cannot be attributed to incompetence. GCHQ has extremely capable staff, and the discovery that they were able to eavesdrop on all Internet communications in the UK demonstrates their technical skills.
Although not explicitly stated in the specifications, MIKEY-SAKKE supports key escrow. This means that if the network provider is served with a warrant or is hacked, it is possible to recover responder private keys and decrypt past calls without the legitimate communication partners' knowledge. Thus, Secure Chorus facilitates undetectable mass surveillance in a way that EDH-based key encryption schemes would not. This is presented as a feature rather than a bug, with the motivating case in the GCHQ documentation being to allow companies to listen to their employees' calls when investigating misconduct, such as in the financial industry. 8 However, GCHQ's 2010 submission to the 3GPP standardization committee responsible for security (SA3) makes it clear that MIKEY-SAKKE was designed to assist with lawenforcement and intelligence agency eavesdropping (known as lawful intercept [LI]): "In light of these requirements, UK government has developed a similar scheme, MIKEY-SAKKE, which supports 3GPP SA3 LI requirements and has additional benefits such as low latency." 9 In this submission, GCHQ stated that MIKEY-IBAKE might interfere with large-scale surveillance and proposed that MIKEY-SAKKE, with its overt key-escrow facility, should be used instead. In 2012, AlcatelLucent and Rogers Wireless proposed an alternative and more covert keyescrow approach to the same committee 10 : deliberately weakening the random-number generation in the MIKEY-IBAKE EDH exchange rather than replacing it with MIKEY-SAKKE.
Another way in which MIKEY-SAKKE differs from secure instant messaging and phone systems is that there is no attempt to protect the identities of the communication partners, only the call content. In this way, an eavesdropper can build up social network maps showing who is communicating, when, and how often, even if anonymizing technology is used. This metadata is often more sensitive than the content. General Michael Hayden, former director of the NSA, once stated, "We kill people based on metadata." 11 This design is not an accident-the GCHQ documentation states that "MIKEY-SAKKE is an enterprise-level solution where anonymity is not possible."
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IMPLICATIONS OF PROTOCOL DESIGN
Key escrow is an approach for building back doors into encryption systems, which the NSA promoted in the early 1990s and built into the Clipper encryption device. With Clipper, a normal key-exchange algorithm would be performed but the session key would also be encrypted under a separate escrow key held by a special department of the US government (the escrow agent). An encrypted call could be listened to by requesting that the escrow agent decrypt the escrowed session key. The escrow agent would allow use of the escrow key only after verifying legal authorization and would record such requests for oversight audits. Under strong opposition from civil liberties groups, scientists, and politicians, NSA dropped the key escrow proposals. MIKEY-SAKKE works differently (sometimes its approach is called "key recovery"). First, the ability of a third party to decrypt past calls is integral to the MIKEY-SAKKE key-exchange process, so it is harder to bypass. One flaw in the Clipper protocol was that someone could use the chip to encrypt calls but prevent the escrowed session key from being usable, 12 and such behavior would not be possible to detect unless the escrow facility was actually used. Secondly, the control over access to recovered keys in MIKEY-SAKKE is different. With Clipper, the ability to decrypt escrowed keys would be with a government agency, possibly under joint control, and any use would be audited. With MIKEY-SAKKE, access to private keys would be provided by companies operating communication networks and, as a result, might be more vulnerable to hacking, intimidation of employees, or insider abuse, and subject to less oversight. MIKEY-SAKKE is not GCHQ's first attempt to promote a key-exchange protocol that facilitates key escrow. The 1996 GCHQ protocol 13 differs in the details (particularly as it predates the SAKKE encryption scheme by four years) but has similar characteristics. Like MIKEY-SAKKE, the GCHQ protocol is based on IBE, and private keys are distributed by a central authority that can also decrypt messages. A notable difference, however, is that the GCHQ protocol explicitly supported key escrow to allow for law enforcement and intelligence agency access. This controversial aspect has not been included in the description of MIKEY-SAKKE; instead, its efficiency over EDH is emphasized. The recurrence of key-escrow proposals from GCHQ is not surprising, given the conflict of interest inherent in making one agency responsible for both spying on and preventing spying on communications. GCHQ designs the encryption technology used by government to prevent unauthorized parties from accessing classified information, but GCHQ also wants the ability to examine how this encryption technology is used to investigate suspected leaks to companies, the press, or foreign intelligence agencies.
The situation becomes more complex when the encryption technology used by companies is deliberately weakened to facilitate surveillance, and these weaknesses are then exploited by others. One such case is the Dual_EC_ DRBG cryptographic random number generator in Juniper Network Inc.'s network equipment, which was almost certainly designed as an NSA back door. Juniper tried to close it, but someone else later modified it to give access to an unknown party. 14 As the Juniper case and the development of MIKEY-SAKKE show, the increased use of commercial software for securing government communications-and the increased use of government-supported security software for securing commercial communications-makes it difficult to predict the wide-scale implications of design changes promoted by intelligence agencies.
Broader implications of fragile security mechanisms
Phillip Rogaway, a professor of computer science at the University of California, Davis, argues that cryptography is not politically neutral, 15 so it has moral dimensions in addition to presenting intellectually stimulating puzzles for mathematicians. Cryptography has the capability of rearranging power, and certain designs have fundamentally different characteristics. As an example, Rogaway notes that "one can easily see the authoritarian tendency built into IBE." 15 Author and professor Langdon Winner argues that the design of some physical artifacts requires or at least encourages particular social structures of power and authority. 16 An example is civilian nuclear power: because of the incredible damage that could result from a terrorist obtaining just a tiny amount of nuclear material, it would be considered necessary to impose strict safeguards such as widespread surveillance and other intrusions on civil liberties. In this way, a technical artifact such as nuclear power can have deep and unavoidable political and social ramifications. Building inherently fragile communications security systems also naturally leads to certain political structures. When a compromised network provider gives an attacker the ability to decrypt any message, the justification for extraordinary efforts (and budget) to protect these systems follows. Not only must there be strong assurance that the network provider's critical aspects work correctly, but network surveillance to detect and prevent future attacks must also be put in place. Background checks on employees and strict secrecy as to how security mechanisms work also seem likely, leading
MIKEY-SAKKE IS NOT GCHQ'S FIRST ATTEMPT TO PROMOTE A KEY-EXCHANGE PROTOCOL THAT FACILITATES KEY ESCROW.
to impositions on civil liberties that extend beyond those necessary for the network provider's protection.
TOWARD SECURE VOICE COMMUNICATIONS
Robust communications security systems avoid having centralized weak points, such as the network provider in MIKEY-SAKKE-based encryption systems. EDH key agreement gives most of the properties required to meet the EFF criteria, and is implemented for voice communications in the Secure Communications Interoperability Protocol (SCIP) and the Z Real-time Transport Protocol (ZRTP), among others. SCIP, which was developed by the NSA, is mainly used for government applications, and ZRTP is mostly used in civilian applications. The MIKEY-SAKKE design documentation explicitly states that these protocols did not meet GCHQ's "scale and usability requirements," but does not expand on this claim. One voice encryption application that meets all seven EFF criteria is Signal (formerly RedPhone) from Open Whisper Systems. Using ZRTP means that it is end-to-end encrypted (criteria 1 and 2) and offers forward security (criterion 4)-see Table 1 . Its design and code are available for audit (criteria 5 and 6), and it has been examined (criterion 7). Preventing man-in-the-middle attacks (criterion 3) is the most challenging requirement, as it forces the user to rely on the security of third parties or carry out their own checks. For this reason, the major differentiating factor between voice encryption schemes is how these checks are performed.
Like other ZRTP-based designs, Signal's instant-message encryption facility (formerly called TextSecure) offers another approach to preventing man-in-the-middle attacks by allowing callers to meet in person before calling and verifying that the "fingerprint" of the other caller's long-term public key matches. This same approach could be also applied to voice encryption. Moreover, Signal's instant-message facility uses a variant of EDH (Axolotl), which offers forward security even when one party is offline. This facility could be used for end-to-end encrypted voicemail, which is one of GCHQ's reasons for using MIKEY-SAKKE rather than EDH in standard MIKEY.
While cryptographically sound, manual fingerprint verification is difficult for nonexperts to perform; as a result, it is hidden in a part of the Signal user interface where only dedicated experts will find it. This is one example of the Signal authors making difficult choices to help make the software easy to use, encouraging widespread use.
Although not one of the seven criteria, widespread use of cryptographic tools is also a security advantage. If encrypted messaging is rare, those who use it could be more of a target for attacks. Good usability is necessary to achieve widespread use: if secure calls are more difficult to complete than insecure ones, few people will make the effort or might spend so much time struggling with the software that they will not be able to detect man-in-themiddle attacks.
The ability to discover which contacts support which secure voice standard-as well as to obtain the contacts' public keys-is also necessary to achieve widespread use. Signal uses phone numbers as identifiers, and its central service allows users to discover which of their contacts also have Signal. This centralization is great for usability but puts Signal users' metadata somewhat at risk. Metadata protection, both for contact discovery and calls in large-scale networks, is a difficult and unsolved problem.
Preventing man-in-themiddle attacks
There are other options available for resisting man-in-the-middle attacks. Key continuity, also known as Trust on First Use (TOFU), relies on the fact that although man-in-the-middle attacks are possible, they are hard to perform consistently because users move between different networks. In TOFU-based schemes, the first public key used by a contact is stored, and any change to this key is flagged as cause for suspicion that a man-in-the-middle attack has started (or stopped). Secure Shell (SSH) popularized this model, and Silent Phone-another ZRTP implementation-uses it in addition to Short Authentication Strings.
For HTTPS-encrypted Web browsing, the certification authority (CA) system is intended to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. The same system is used for S/MIME-encrypted email and could also be applied to encrypted phone calls. CAs certify that a particular public key corresponds to a particular domain name or email address. This approach is convenient for users because their Web browser or email client does all the checking for them, but a malicious or compromised CA can harm users. In 2011, two CAs were compromised by hackers affiliated with or supporting the Iranian government. 18 Preventing such attacks is difficult, but Certificate Transparency aims to help detect such attacks quickly, allowing for better mitigation.
OpenPGP-encrypted email implements an extension of key fingerprint verification called the Web of Trust, in which users not only check their contacts' key fingerprints but can also rely on checks that their contacts perform on their own contacts, and so on. When the links between contacts become more visible, sensitive metadata is compromised. Because of the metadata it leaks, the Web of Trust database is now built into tools for covert intelligence gathering, so I am not optimistic that the Web of Trust is sufficiently usable and secure for phone-call encryption. Even for email, the leading OpenPGP implementation (GnuPG) now implements TOFU.
A final method for man-in-themiddle protection is the Off the Record (OTR) instant-messaging protocol, which could also be applied to secure voice communication. With OTR, communication partners agree on a short password (perhaps by meeting in person), or decide on a question to which only the legitimate partner will know the correct answer. This is combined with the EDH key exchange, making it impossible for an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack without knowing the secret information. 19 
Supporting investigation of misconduct
None of the ZRTP-based implementations mentioned here supports key escrow, but third-party access to encrypted calls might be necessary for some niche applications. The MIKEY-SAKKE documentation suggests that the regulated financial industry is one such case, but in reality what that industry needs is quite different from what MIKEY-SAKKE offers. The use of MIKEY-SAKKE means that encrypted calls that are recorded can be decrypted indefinitely into the future, because the network provider has a long-term master private key from which all user keys can be generated. The financial industry requires recorded calls to be kept for the legally mandated time and permanently deleted immediately after this period. In addition, key escrow is only useful if the encrypted calls are recorded as a matter of course, and financial companies do not do this.
For these reasons, it is better to build regulatory-mandated callrecording systems on top of secure phone systems and record the calls before they are encrypted or after they are decrypted on the other side. This is how today's products for recording calls in the financial industry work, and there is no reason for change.
Financial companies do not have perfect security, so it is a huge risk to have a permanently available server store the master private key for all their communications, which is unavoidable with MIKEY-SAKKE. If call recording uses separate mechanisms to those for end-to-end encryption, the call-recording key can be kept offline and only used when investigating suspected misconduct. In this way, recordings could be deleted when there is no regulatory or business reason to keep them, and at that point anyone who has eavesdropped on the encrypted call would not be able to decrypt the call due to forward security. It is also advisable for the financial industry to use the same applications as other industries, in addition to using products that protect metadata, to prevent staff from being targeted.
FUTURE WORK
MIKEY-SAKKE's design is motivated by the desire to allow undetectable and unauditable mass surveillance, which might be required in some scenarios such as government departments processing classified information. However, in the vast majority of cases, MIKEY-SAKKE is actively harmful to security. It creates a vulnerable single point of failure, which would require huge effort, skill, and cost to secure, requiring resources beyond the capability of most companies. Better options for voice encryption exist today, though they are not perfect either.
M
ore work is needed to provide usable protection against man-in-the-middle attacks, and to protect metadata. More broadly, protocol and system designers need to recognize the ethical consequences of their actions in terms of the political and power structures that naturally follow the use of these protocols and systems. MIKEY-SAKKE is the latest example to raise questions about putting intelligence agencies in charge of protecting companies and individuals from spying, given the conflict of interest it creates.
